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Abstract
In anonymous secret sharing schemes, the secret can be recon-
structed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares.
In this paper, we derive a tighter lower bound on the size of the
shares than the bound of Blundo and Stinson for anonymous (k, n)-
threshold schemes with 1 < k < n. Our bound is tight for k = 2.
We also show a close relationship between optimum anonymous (2, n)-
threshold secret schemes and combinatorial designs.
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1 Introduction
A (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme [1, 6] is a method in which a dealer
distributes a secret s to a set of n users in such a way that any k or more
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users can recover the secret s and any k−1 or less users have no information
on s. On the other hand, in an anonymous secret sharing scheme, the secret
can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which
shares. In such schemes, the computation of the secret can be carried out
by giving the shares to a black box that does not know the identities of
the participants holding those shares. This would seem to be a desirable
property in certain applications. For example, if the scheme is to be used
to provide access to a secure area, then an anonymous scheme will provide
security without the need for a separate identification protocol.
Anonymous secret sharing schemes were first investigated by Stinson and
Vanstone [7]. In the model proposed in [7], the participants receive distinct
shares (we will call such a scheme a “strict” anonymous scheme). The
authors proved a lower bound on the size of the shares and provided optimal
schemes for certain class of threshold structures by using a combinatorial
characterization of optimal schemes.
Next Phillips and Phillips [5] considered a different model for anonymous
secret sharing schemes. In their model, different participants are allowed to
receive the same shares. They analyzed ideal anonymous secret sharing
schemes in which the size of the shares given to each participant is equal to
the size of the secret. The authors proved that an ideal anonymous (k, n)-
threshold scheme can be realized if and only if k = 1 or k = n.
Recently, Blundo and Stinson [2] showed a lower bound on the size of the
shares for (k, n)-threshold schemes with 1 < k < n together with another
lower bound for an infinite class of access structures. They also presented
constructions, some of which use Steiner systems.
In this paper, we derive a tighter lower bound on the size of the shares
than the bound of Blundo and Stinson for anonymous (k, n)-threshold scheme
with 1 < k < n. Our bound is tight for k = 2. We also show a close rela-
tionship between optimum anonymous (2, n)-threshold secret schemes and
resolvable Steiner systems.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and definitions
Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of n participants and D be a dealer. Let S be
a set of secrets and V be a set of shares. Suppose that the dealer D wants
to share the secret s ∈ S among the participants in P.
We represent a secret sharing scheme by a collection of distribution rules.
2
A distribution rule is a function
f : P ∪ {D} → S ∪ V
which satisfies the conditions f(D) ∈ S and f(Pi) ∈ V for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
A distribution rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to partici-
pants, where f(D) is the secret being shared, and f(Pi) is the share given
to Pi. If s ∈ S is the secret that D wants to share, then D will choose a
distribution rule f such that
f(D) = s
uniformly at random, and use f to distribute shares to participants.
Let {Pr(s)}s∈S be a probability distribution on S. Let F be a family
of distribution rules. We define (k, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes as
follows.
Definition 2.1 A (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a collection of
distribution rules F that satisfy the following two properties:
1. If A ⊆ P and |A| ≥ k, then for all a = {(Pi, vi) : Pi ∈ A, vi ∈ V } with
Pr(a) > 0, a unique secret s ∈ S exists such that Pr(s | a) = 1.
2. If B ⊆ P and |B| ≤ k − 1, then for all b = {(Pi, vi) : Pi ∈ B, vi ∈ V }
with Pr(b) > 0, and for all secrets s ∈ S, it holds Pr(s | b) = Pr(s).
Definition 2.2 [5, 2] An anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme
is a collection of distribution rules F which satisfies Property 2. of Definition
2.1, as well as the following property:
1′. If A ⊆ P and |A| ≥ k, then for all v = [vi : Pi ∈ A, vi ∈ V ] with
Pr(v) > 0, a unique secret s ∈ S exists such that Pr(s | v) = 1.
Finally, we will use braces { } to denote sets and square brackets [ ] to
denote multisets (a multiset is a set containing repeated elements).
2.2 Known results
Phillips and Phillips showed the following proposition [5].
Proposition 2.1 There exists an anonymous (k, n)-threshold scheme such
that |V | = |S| if and only if k = 1 or k = n.
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Therefore, |V | > |S| if 1 < k < n from [3, 4]. Blundo and Stinson showed
a lower bound on |V | for 1 < k < n such as follows [2].
Proposition 2.2 In any anonymous (k, n)-threshold schemes with 1 < k <
n,
|V | >
[
(n− k + 2) |S| − 1|S| − 1
]
(|S| − 1).
3 Tighter Lower Bound on |V |
In this section, we derive a tighter lower bound on |V | than Proposition 2.2
for anonymous (k, n)-threshold schemes. Let
S = {1, 2, · · · , |S|}.
For each f ∈ F , define
Bf
4
= [f(Pj) : k − 1 ≤ j ≤ n]
where Bf is a multiset. We call Bf a block.
Fix a distribution rule f0 ∈ F arbitrarily and define
Fi 4= {f ∈ F : f(D) = i, f(Pj) = f0(Pj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 2},
Ai 4= [Bf : f ∈ Fi],
A0 4= A1 ∪ A2 ∪ · · ·A|S|.
Suppose that x ∈ V occurs cfx times in Bf . Let
cix
4
=
∑
f∈Fi
cfx.
Then Blundo and Stinson showed the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 [2, page 20] In any anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret
sharing scheme with 1 < k < n :
1. There exists a constant cx such that
cix = cx
for any i ∈ S.
2. If [x, y] occurs in some block Bf such that f(D) = i, then [x, y] occurs
in no block Bf ′ such that f ′(D) 6= i.
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3.1 Our lower bound
Now we present our lower bound. Let
c
4
= max
x∈V
cx.
Theorem 3.1 In any anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme
with 1 < k < n,
|V | ≥ (|S| − 1)(n− k + 1) + 1.
Proof. Choose x0 ∈ V such that
cx0 = c
arbitrarily. Then there are two cases.
(Case 1)
[x0, x0] appears in some block Bf1 . Suppose that f1(D) = s. That is,
Bf1 ∈ As. From Proposition 3.1 (2), [x0, x0] appears in no block of any
Aj with j 6= s. On the other hand, from Proposition 3.1 (1), x0 occurs in
exactly c blocks of Aj .
Now for j 6= s, let
Dj
4
= {Bf | x0 ∈ Bf , Bf ∈ Aj}.
Then we have |Dj | = c. Define Mj be the c× (n− k + 2) matrix such that
each Bf ∈ Dj is a row of Mj . Let
Yj
4
= {y | y ∈Mj , y 6= x0}.
Note that each y ∈ Yj appears in Mj at most cy times, where cy ≤ c. Count
the elements (other than x0) of Mj in two ways. Then
c(n− k + 1) ≤
∑
y∈Yj
cy ≤
∑
y∈Yj
c = c|Yj |. (1)
Hence
|Yj | ≥ n− k + 1. (2)
Next for any j1 6= j2,
Yj1 ∩ Yj2 = ∅
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from Proposition 3.1 (2). Consequently.
|V | ≥ |{x0}|+
∑
j 6=s
|Yj | (3)
≥ 1 + (|S| − 1)(n− k + 1). (4)
(Case 2)
[x0, x0] occurs in no blocks. Then similarly to (case 1), we have
|Yj | ≥ n− k + 1
for any j ∈ S. Therefore,
|V | ≥ |{x0}|+
∑
j
|Yj |
≥ |S|(n− k + 1) + 1
> (|S| − 1)(n− k + 1) + 1.
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It is easy to see that this bound is tighter than Proposition 2.2.
3.2 Generalization
A qualified subset of P which can recover the secret is called an access set,
and the family of all access sets is called the access structure, denoted by Γ.
Definition 3.1 [5, 2] An anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ is a col-
lection of distribution rules which satisfy the following two properties:
1. If A ∈ Γ, then for all v = [vi : Pi ∈ A, vi ∈ V ] with Pr(v) > 0, a
unique secret s ∈ S exists such that Pr(s | v) = 1.
2. If B 6∈ Γ, then for all b = {(Pi, vi) : Pi ∈ B, vi ∈ V } with Pr(b) > 0,
and for all secrets s ∈ S, it holds Pr(s | b) = Pr(s).
Blundo and Stinson showed the following lower bound on |V | by gener-
alizing the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Definition 3.2 We say that B ⊆ P is a semi-maximal nonaccess set if
B∪{Pi} 6∈ Γ for all Pi ∈ P \B and B∪{Pi, Pj} ∈ Γ for all {Pi, Pj} ⊆ P \B.
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Proposition 3.2 [2] Suppose that there exists a semi-maximal nonaccess
set B ⊆ P in an anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ. Then
|V | >
[
(n− |B|) |S| − 1|S| − 1
]
(|S| − 1).
Let Γ0 = {{P1, P3, P4}, {P2, P4}, {P1, P2}} be the minimal qualified
set of an access structure on the set of participants P = {P1, P2, P3, P4}.
In this case, we can take B = {P3}.
Corollary 3.1 [2] In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ0,
|V | > 2|S| − 5 + 3|S| .
On the other hand, by generalizing the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can
obtain the following lower bounds.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that there exists a semi-maximal nonaccess set B ⊆
P in an anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ. Then
|V | ≥ (n− |B| − 1)(|S| − 1) + 1.
Corollary 3.2 In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ0,
|V | ≥ 2|S| − 1.
It is clear that our bounds are tighter than Proposition 3.2 and Corollary
3.1.
4 Relationship with Combinatorial Designs
4.1 Steiner systems
We now present some basic terminology from design theory. A k-(v, n, λ)
design is a pair (V,B), where V is a set of v elements and B is a family of
subsets of V of size n (called blocks), such that every subset of elements of
size k appears in exactly λ blocks. A k-(v, n, λ) design is said to be non-
trivial if k < n < v. A Steiner system is a k-(v, n, 1) design, also denoted by
S(k, n, v). Let (V,B) be a Steiner system. We say that (V,B) is partitionable
if we can partition the set of blocks B into sets B1, . . ., B` in such a way that
each (V,Bj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ `, is a Steiner system S(k − 1, n, v). If a Steiner
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system is partitionable, then the integer ` = (v − k + 1)/(n − k + 1). A
partitionable S(2, n, v) is called resolvable. For general information on the
existence of k-(v, n, λ) designs, we refer to [8]
Blundo and Stinson showed the following Proposition [2].
Proposition 4.1 If there exists a resolvable Steiner system S(2, n, |V |),
then there exists an anonymous (2, n)-threshold scheme with |V | = (|S| −
1)(n− 1) + 1.
4.2 Relationship between optimum schemes and Steiner sys-
tems
We say that an anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is opti-
mum if the equality of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied. Then we obtain the following
theorem immediately from Proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 There exists an optimum anonymous (2, n)-threshold secret
sharing scheme if there exists a resolvable Steiner system S(2, n, |V |).
This Theorem implies that Theorem 3.1 is tight for k = 2.
We next prove a weak converse of Theorem 4.1. That is, we prove that
there exists a Steiner system S(2, n, |V |) (not necessarily resolvable) if there
exists an optimum anonymous (2, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
In what follows, suppose that there exists an optimum anonymous (k, n)-
threshold secret sharing scheme. Then the following lemmas hold from the
proof of Theorem 3.1. (We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem
3.1.)
Lemma 4.1 (Case 2) does not occur and all the equalities of (case 1) are
satisfied.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 3.1. 2
Lemma 4.2 Each block Bf = [bk−1, bk, . . . , bn] ∈ A0 must satisfy either
bk−1 = bk = · · · = bn
or
bi 6= bj for any i 6= j.
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Proof. Note that
cx = c
for any x ∈ V from the equality of eq. (1). Therefore, the proof of (case 1)
holds for any x0 ∈ V .
Suppose that some [x0, x0] appears in Bf ∈ A0. Then from the equality
of eq.(4), it must be that
Bf = [x0, x0, · · · , x0].
2
Lemma 4.3 If B ∈ Dj, then all the elements of B are distinct.
Proof. From the definition of Dj , [x0, x0] does not appear in any B ∈ Dj .
Therefore, B contains {x0, y} such that y 6= x0. Then form lemma 4.2, all
the elements of B are distinct.
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Now for each j with j 6= s, choose one block B˜j ∈ Dj arbitrarily. Let
B 4= {B˜j | j 6= s}.
We will prove that (B, V ) is a Steiner system S(2, n, |V |) for k = 2.
Lemma 4.4 Any B ∈ Dj is a permutation of B˜j.
Proof. From lemma 4.3 and the equality of eq.(2). 2
Lemma 4.5 Any two distinct elements {x0, y} appear in at least one block
of B.
Proof. From the equality of eq.(3), any {x0, y} appears in some block
B′ ∈ Dj with j 6= s.
On the other hand, from lemma 4.4, any B′ ∈ Dj is a permutation of
B˜j . Therefore, {x0, y} is included in B˜j . Hence, {x0, y} appears in some
block of B. 2
Theorem 4.2 There exists a Steiner system S(2, n, |V |) if there exists an
optimum anonymous (2, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
Proof. Note that
|Bf | = n− k + 2 = n
9
if k = 2. First suppose that some two distinct elements {x0, y} appear in
two or more blocks of B. These blocks must belong to the same Ah because
{x0, y} determines the secret h uniquely (k = 2). However, we chose one
block from Ah to construct B. This is a contradiction.
Then from lemma 4.5, any two distinct elements appear in exactly one
block of B. Therefore, (B, V ) is a Steiner system S(2, n, |V |). 2
5 Impossibility for k ≥ 3
In this section, we show that the equality of Theorem 3.1 cannot be satisfied
for 3 ≤ k < n.
Definition 5.1 We say that {P1, · · · , Pk−2} is a base set of the participants.
Theorem 5.1 In any anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme
with 3 ≤ k < n,
|V | > (|S| − 1)(n− k + 1) + 1.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an optimum anonymous (k, n)-threshold
scheme for some 3 ≤ k < n.
P1 is included in the base set (see Def.5.1) since k− 2 ≥ 1. For f0 in the
definition of Fi, let y = f0(P1).
From lemma 4.3 and lemma 4.5, there exists a Bf1 ∈ A0 such that y
appears in Bf1 and all the elements of Bf1 are distinct. Without loss of
generality, we can suppose that f1(Pn) = y. Then we have that
f0(P1) = f1(P1) = f1(Pn) = y. (5)
f1(Pn−1) 6= f1(Pn). (6)
Next let {P2, · · · , Pk−1} be a base set of the participants and define
F ′i 4= {f ∈ F : f(D) = i, f(Pj) = f1(Pj) for 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1},
B′f
4
= [f(Pj) : j = 1, k, k + 1, . . . , n],
A′i 4= [Bf : f ∈ F ′i ],
A′0 4= A′1 ∪ · · · ∪ A′|S|.
Then [y, y] appears in B′f1 ∈ A′0 from eq.(5). Therefore, from lemma 4.2, it
must be that
B′f1 = [y, · · · , y].
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However, this contradicts to eq.(6).
2
By generalizing the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can strengthen Theorem
3.2 as follows.
Theorem 5.2 Suppose that there exist two semi-maximal nonaccess sets B1
and B2 such that |B1| = |B2| = m and |P \ (B1∪B2)| ≥ 2 in an anonymous
secret sharing scheme for Γ. Then
|V | > (n−m− 1)(|S| − 1) + 1.
Let Γ1 = {{P1, P2, P3}, {P1, P2, P4}, {P1, P2, P5}, {P3, P4}, {P3, P5}, {P4, P5}}
be the minimal qualified set of an access structure on the set of partici-
pants P = {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}. In this case, we can take B1 = {P1} and
B2 = {P2}. Note that
|P \ (B1 ∪B2)| = |{P3, P4, P5}| ≥ 2.
Corollary 5.1 In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ1,
|V | > 3|S| − 2.
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